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Abstract: Scholarly attempts to analyze 
the history of science sometime suff er 
from an imprecise use of terms. In order 
to understand accurately how science 
has developed and from where it draws 
its roots, researchers should be careful 
to recognize that epistemic regimes 
change over time and acceptable forms 
of knowledge production are contingent 
upon the hegemonic discourse informing 
the epistemic regime of any given period. 
In order to understand the importance 
of this point, I  apply the techniques of 
historical epistemology to an analysis 
of the place of the study of astrology in 
the medieval and early modern periods 
alongside a  discussion of the “language 
games” of these period as well as the role 
of the “archeology of knowledge” in unco-
vering meaning in our study of the past. 
In sum, I  argue that the term “science” 
should be used only with the greatest care 
and the utmost hesitancy when studying 
approaches to knowledge formation 
prior to the seventeenth century.
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Filosofi e přírody, nebo věda 
v předmoderních epistemických 
režimech? 
Případ astrologie Alberta 
Velikého a Galilea Galilei
Abstrakt: Badatelské snahy analyzovat 
dějiny vědy někdy trpí nepřesným po-
užíváním termínů. Pokud mají přesně 
porozumět tomu, jak se věda vyvíjí a kde 
se nacházejí její kořeny, výzkumníci by 
měli s  pečlivostí rozpoznat, že episte-
mické režimy se mění v  průběhu času 
a akceptovatelné formy produkce vědění 
se odvíjejí od  hegemonického diskurzu, 
jenž zásadně formuje epistemický 
režim každé dané doby. Pro pochopení 
důležitosti této pointy používám tech-
niky historické epistemologie k  analýze 
místa astrologického bádání v obdobích 
středověku a  raného novověku, spolu 
s  diskuzí o  “ jazykových hrách” těchto 
období a také o roli “archeologie vědění” 
v odkrývání významu v našem zkoumání 
minulosti. V souhrnu tvrdím, že termín 
“věda” by měl být používán pouze s nej-
vyšší opatrností a se značným váháním, 
pokud má sloužit pro zkoumání přístupů 
k utváření vědění před 17. stoletím.
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Science is a term frequently employed with little regard for historical con-
text. Modern researchers such as David Pingree have sought to describe 
and defend the work of Babylonian astrologers as “science”1 while others 
such as David Lindberg have pointed to work in the same discipline as one 
example among many of the high level of development in the sciences to 
be found in medieval Europe.2 However, the use of the terms “science” and 
“scientifi c” in these ways is only possible if one ignores the very diff erent 
regimes of epistemic discourse that prevailed in these premodern societies. 
Furthermore, application of the term “science” to the work of scholars such 
as the thirteenth-century theologian who has been saint of scientists since 
1931, Albert the Great (d. 1280), or his near contemporary Robert Gros-
seteste (d.  1260), imposes a  series of expectations and perception-altering 
fi lters that only increases the distance between us and these historical actors. 
Instead, there are sound reasons for a return to the use of the term natural 
philosophy that, for all its imprecision, reveals rather than imposes meaning 
on the past.
A discussion of terminology might seem pedantic, but nothing could be 
further from the truth in regards to the current issue: If we wish to under-
stand accurately the history of science, it is useful to begin by reframing the 
terms of our study of the past. Attempting to identify premodern “scientists” 
and “sciences” is epistemologically unsound and attempts to do so are de-
rived from unexamined assumptions based on limited consideration of the 
language game of the modern scientifi c epistemic regime within which re-
searchers are necessarily embedded. Th e various elements in this argument 
will be examined below, but before we move on it would serve us well to start 
with the recognition that as the philosophers of science Boris Castel and 
Sergio Sismundo have said, “Th e modern world, and perhaps what it means 
to be modern, is thoroughly entwined with science,”3 a  situation that has 
led to a virtual redefi nition of the terms “rational” and “scientifi c”4 as near 
1  David PINGREE, “Astrology.” In: YOUNG, M. J. L. – LATHAM, J. D. – SERJEANT, 
R.  B. (eds.), Religion, Learning, and Science in the ‘Abbasid Period. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1990, p. 290–299.
2  David C. LINDBERG, Science in the Middle Ages. 2nd printing. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1980.
3  Boris CASTEL – Sergio SISMUNDO, Th e Art of Science. Toronto: UTP Higher Education 
2003, p. 9.
4  Alvin I. GOLDMAN off ers a vigorous defense of such an equation in his work, Knowledge in 
a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 248–254, passim.
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synonyms in our modern world. However, we should not assume that a mod-
ernist rationality is the only viable form of that discourse. Understanding 
the past requires a more serious application of the archeology of knowledge 
than is indicated by the ahistorical application of terms created to explain 
modern exercises in the formation of knowledge, and a failure to recognize 
the problems inherent with such an approach creates a serious potential for 
confusion about what historical actors were actually doing and where their 
intellectual pursuits fi t within their own cultures, as well as in any history 
of the development of knowledge. In order to clarify why this is important, 
I  will compare medieval European astrology and astronomy with similar 
pursuits undertaken by early-modern Europeans such as Galileo Galilei as 
case studies to demonstrate the heuristic value of historical epistemology.
But fi rst, in order to establish the theoretical framework for my work, 
I should briefl y explain what I mean when I use the term epistemic regime, 
before going on to a discussion of the role of language games and the arche-
ology of knowledge as related to my current study. Taking up the concept 
of the epistemic regime fi rst, its usefulness to my work lies in the fact that 
it refocuses our understanding of idea and knowledge formation away from 
wholly voluntaristic models while indicating how selectivity and action 
within the realms of intellectual action occur within a web of internal and 
external regulative frameworks.5 Th is regulation does not occur completely 
within the mind of the individual, though as I will argue below the unspo-
ken and unexamined set of assumptions informing the questions one asks 
and how one goes about answering those questions are important factors. 
Connected to those sets of issues, though, is the interrelated social, political, 
economic, and educational dimensions constituted by “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge,”6 as with any other regime. Th erefore, 
within any given epistemic regime, knowledge production, as well as what 
constitutes knowledge and proof, is predicated upon a host of historically 
and socially-contingent factors.
5  Michel FOUCAULT, Th e Archaeology of Knowledge. A. M. Sheridan Smith (trans.). New York: 
Pantheon Books 1972, p. 69–70; Aant ELZINGA, “Science as the Continuation of Politics by 
Other Means.” In: BRANTE, T. – FULLER, S. – LYNCH, W. (eds.), Controversial Science: 
From Content to Contention. Albany: State University of New York 1993, p. 127–152. I would 
hasten to add that neither am I attempting to deny wholly the role of voluntaristic exercises 
on the part of individual scientists. Th e point I wish to make is that such willed actions never 
occur completely independent of external infl uences and internal mental structures.
6  Stephen KRASNER, International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983, p. 2.
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However, the ways in which one communicates knowledge, as well as 
builds it in a collaborative social venture, is dependent upon the uses of lan-
guage and words. As Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, the meaning of a word is 
dependent on its use – linguistic statements have no independent ontological 
status.7 Th us, in order to understand any statement, be it a word, a sentence, 
or a  larger construct, the interplay between language and language user 
must be considered. Th e use of language is not random, as the language, the 
actions of its users, and the users themselves all interact within the frame-
work of a language game and its rules.8 ˝Given these broadly-defi ned rules, 
within any given cultural context there are countless ways in which words 
can be manipulated to create sentences and almost as many diff erent mean-
ings for individual words. Perhaps more important to the topic here under 
consideration, language games are dynamic and continually changing, with 
new ones coming into being and old ones passing away continually.9 Even 
a surface consideration of the way the Internet has changed the use of lan-
guage will support this argument, with old words such as “web” taking on 
entirely new meanings and new terms such as “download” being regularly 
generated. In contrast terms with ages reckoned in decades are already pass-
ing into obscurity: few modern teenagers would readily associate the term 
“cassette” with music, if they even knew what the word meant.
Th erefore, in order to understand what any word means, an individual 
must always learn its role in the language game, which requires historical 
and cultural contextualization. Its use will always be rule governed and 
terms functioning outside the boundaries of these rules have no meaning. 
However, as stated previously, the rules in question are not immutable, but 
instead are historically and socially contingent. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly for our current study, analysis of the discontinuities involved with 
language use, or dispersion as Michel Foucault would term it, is itself part of 
the process of understanding any given statement.10 Th is analysis must take 
into account that the statement – or in this case word – involves not only 
a referent but also an associated fi eld through which statements and words 
can interact in discursive formations.11 Such formations carry important 
connotative as well as denotative meaning for all terms involved in their 
7  Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.). New 
York: Macmillan 1953, section 11.
8  Ibid., section 7.
9  Ibid., section 23. 
10  FOUCAULT, p. 37.
11  Ibid., p. 86–99.
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construction and must be understood as elements of the “archive” of a given 
culture, meaning not only the terms themselves but also the interrelated 
historically-contingent elements of which any given term makes up a part. 
In other words, the use of a term such as “science” necessarily involves an 
invocation of the set of ideas and practices that gave it birth, denoting its 
place within a specifi c language game. When employed by a language user 
it is almost impossible for it not to condition the way he or she considers the 
subject of analysis, nor can such a use help but infl uence the assessment of 
a language hearer, or reader as the case may be. What is conveyed, then, is 
not a meaning associated with a single term, but instead a range of meanings 
associated with a discursive formation conditioned by an epistemic regime 
of modern scientism.
Th erefore, when a modern researcher uses a term that would have been 
unknown to the historical actors to whom it is applied, such as “scientist” 
or even “science,” the choice for so doing is conditioned by the hegemonic 
discourse within which the language user functions making such a use far 
from a value-neutral descriptor, but in fact a deeply value-laden judgment 
about what is being observed.12 Th e word “science” is chosen rather than 
some other term because of the immense cultural capital that it commands 
within a modernist epistemic regime and the habitus13 – the unexamined 
and unacknowledged assumptions of the researcher imparted largely by the 
hegemonic discourse within which he or she lives – that privileges scientifi c 
modes of rationality over all others. Th us, when a modern intellectual applies 
the term “science” to an intellectual construct existing prior to the invention 
of science – and science should be recognized as a set of techniques and ways 
of examining the world that was invented in the early modern era, as I will 
discuss below – what he or she is actually doing is making a value judgment 
about what is and is not rational about the actions of historical actors. In 
12  For a  discussion of the way hegemonic discourses are constructed and self perpetuate, 
as well as aff ect the perceptions of those embedded within the discourse, see Antonio 
GRAMSCI, Prison Notebooks. Volume III. Joseph A. Buttgieg (trans.). New York: Columbia 
University Press 2007; James A. MARTIN, “Between Ethics and Politics: Gramsci’s Th eory of 
Intellectuals.” In: MARTIN, J. (ed.), Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments of Leading Political 
Philosophers. London: Routledge 2002, p. 124–144.
13  For the concepts of various forms of non-material capital as well as habitus, see: Pierre 
BOURDIEU, “Th e Peculiar History of Scientifi c Reason.” Sociological Forum, vol. 6  1991, 
no. 1, p.  3–26; Pierre BOURDIEU, “Participant Objectivation.” Th e Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, vol. 9, 2003, no. 2, p. 281–294; Joseph MARGOLIS, “Habitus and 
the Logic of Practice.” In: SHUSTERMAN, R. (ed.), Bourdieu: A  Critical Reader, Oxford: 
Blackwell 1999, p. 64–83.
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turn, even an astute reader is prompted to classify intellectual exercises of 
the past as “scientifi c” or “superstitious,” “rational” or “irrational,” based 
upon how closely those activities appear to mirror the activities of a modern 
scientist. Th e result is a deep epistemic confusion about activities of the past 
as can be seen – to provide only one example – in the way diff erent historians 
speak about the study and use of astrology by premodern Europeans. One of 
the most important historians of science of the twentieth century, Alistair 
Crombie, when writing about the medieval and early modern periods refers 
to astrology habitually as a “superstition”14 while others, such as Alexsander 
Birkenmajer, studying the same period have highlighted astrology as an 
important science.15 Obviously both estimations cannot be correct, and in 
fact neither are accurate. Instead, such statements are the results of a failure 
to apply the techniques of historical epistemology, which itself requires 
historical and social contextualization of both the methods of knowledge 
construction and the terms used therein in order to make meaningful sense 
of the terms constituting the statement.
Th is failure is understandable, though, given the imprecise way in 
which science is both used as a term and understood more broadly. Rigorous 
scholars such as Kenneth Robinson apply the term to activities such as those 
of Chinese traditional medicine16 that are far more tradition than theory 
laden while in popular culture it is a word that is habitually used in place of 
“method” or “procedure,” such as the “science of getting rich” or the “science 
of cooking.” To a degree, this is refl ective of a somewhat muddled historical 
use of the term, as revealed by the Oxford English Dictionary. Having been 
derived from the Latin word, scientia, which means “certain knowledge,” 
Richard Hampole seems to have introduced the word “sciens” to the English 
language in his 1340 commentary on the Psalms.17 Judging by the varied 
ways in which it was used over the next four centuries, most participants 
within the various language games that went along with the evolving epis-
temic regimes that developed and gave way to newer discourses during this 
period thought of the word as the equivalent of “knowledge” or “academic 
discipline,” but by the close of the eighteenth century we see the term be-
14  A. C. CROMBIE, Augustine to Galileo: Th e History of Science A.D. 400–1650. 3rd edition. 
Mineola: Dover Publications 1995, p. 36.
15  Alexsander BIRKEMAJER, Etudes d‘Histoires des Sciences en Pologne. Claire Brendel 
(trans.). Warsaw: Zaklad Narodwy im. Ossolinskich 1972, p. 276–308.
16  Joseph NEEDHAM, Science and Civilisation in China. Volume VII. Robinson, K. G. (ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 235.
17  Th e Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online, s.v. “science.”
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ing applied in a much more specifi c way by some authors. Richard Kirwan 
in his 1796 Elements of Mineralogy stated that “Previous to the year 1780, 
mineralogy, though tolerably understood by many as an art, could scarce 
be deemed a Science.” What seems to have supplied the distinction between 
art and science for Kirwan was the methodology of testing coupled with an 
understanding of proof that privileges empirical demonstrations, alongside 
a form of presentation designed to allow other researchers readily to follow 
the chain of thought and experimentation leading to any given scientifi c 
development, all of which becomes clear in Kirwan’s correspondence with 
Henry Cavendish (d. 1810).18
I do not mean to argue that the practices and procedures of science were 
a creation of the eighteenth century – something I will address below – nor 
do I wish to suggest that words should never be used to signify practices or 
things that existed prior to the development of a term or the settling of its 
defi nition. Far from it, for one of Foucault’s essential insights is that words 
and the discursive formations of which they form a part never develop a set-
tled meaning, but instead change in defi nition as the hegemonic discourse 
that forms larger webs of meaning19 for the society shift s. However, it is 
important that before applying any term in an ahistorical manner we should 
fi rst be very clear about what that term actually means as well as what we 
mean by it when applying it to the past. Otherwise, the resulting distortion 
will fi lter and warp our view of the past in wholly unacceptable ways.
So how are we to understand the term science? Attempts to understand 
what science is or is not have generated a vast literature in recent years and it 
is not my intention to wade into that debate. Nor do I wish to enter into the 
discussion about whether or not science functions as scientists themselves 
frequently assume it to work, as the answer to that question is largely ir-
relevant to my argument. Instead, what I hold to be important to my cur-
rent study are the broad outlines of what people conceptualize when they 
hear the term science. While this is certainly to a greater or lesser degree 
dependent on the individual under consideration, it is possible to uncover 
what is generally signifi ed by the term through careful consideration, which 
I will undertake here before moving on to an analysis of why, precisely, it 
18  Christa JUNGNICKEL – Russell MCCORMACH, Cavendish, Th e Experimental Life. 2nd 
edition. Bucknell University Press 2001, p. 366–370.
19  My thinking on “webs of meaning” has been infl uenced by W. V. QUINE, particularly his 
From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2005.
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is epistemologically unsound to employ the term in the study of history as 
loosely as is all too commonly done.
Despite Alex Hill’s confi dent statement at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury that “everyone knows what the term science means, and appreciates its 
value as an amplifi cation of the term knowledge,”20 the situation is not quite 
that simple. More concrete attempts to distill the essence of what is meant by 
science have ranged from those that are intentionally broad ranging to those 
that have made eff orts to be as concretely particularistic as possible. For 
example, the Hungarian-born chemist and philosopher of science, Michael 
Polanyi (d. 1976), chose to focus on the role of imagination and intuition 
in the work of the scientist, while emphatically arguing for equivalencies 
in other forms of research.21 However, Polanyi recognized that science is 
a rule-governed exercise, even if the rules in question are not the same for 
every science and are not always easy to defi nitively describe. On the other 
hand, in an eff ort to develop a universal standard enabling a clear separation 
between science and pseudoscience, Karl Popper (d. 1994) developed the 
rule that “the criterion of the scientifi c status of a theory is its falsifi ability, 
or refutability, or testability.”22 In other words, a scientifi c hypothesis must 
make “risky predictions” that may be tested in ways that allow for either 
confi rmation or refutation and such testing rests upon the gathering and 
evaluation of data that is understood in strictly empirical terms. All of this is 
very well known, but the implications of Popper’s model, which has garnered 
wide-spread (though by no means universal) support among both scientists 
and philosophers of science, are not always fully acknowledged: science is by 
necessity a form of social knowledge intertwined with and dependent upon 
mathematics.
Such a  statement should come as no great surprise to my readers. As 
just one example, Herbert Simon has discussed the role of mathematics in 
science both as a language of proof, guaranteeing rigor that will necessarily 
lead to correct conclusions, as well as a  language of discovery generating 
solutions that may be “checked for correctness.”23 However, the implica-
tion of the importance of mathematics to the way we understand what 
constitutes science is rarely articulated or acknowledged; science functions 
20  Alex HILL, Some Problems of the Day in Natural Science: An Introduction. London: J. M. 
Dent 1900, p. 1.
21  Michael POLANYI, Meaning. Prosch, H. (ed.) Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press 
1975, chapter 3. 
22   Karl POPPER, Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul 1963, p. 34.
23  Herbert A. SIMON, Models of My Life. New York: Basic Books 1991, p. 106–107. 
Scott E. Hendrix
119
as a  mathematically logical exercise in which condition W plus theory X 
multiplied by experiment Y leads to proof Z in a necessary and mathemati-
cal fashion. Th e epistemological challenges to such a  viewpoint need not 
detain us here; what is more important to note is that the very model held 
in the minds of those working within the modernist language game of what 
it is to do science is drawn directly from mathematics, presenting scientifi c 
exercises as a  form of computational exercise allowing for linear truth 
discovery. Th is fact explains why physics – as the most mathematical of all 
the sciences – is typically held up as the paradigm for and most prestigious 
of all the sciences.24 Th is is directly coupled with the model of science as 
social knowledge in that a  scientist’s work must be presented in a  fashion 
that reveals his or her assumptions, actions taken to test them, data, and 
conclusions or else what is occurring is not seen as science by the scientifi c 
community or in the popular imagination.25 Certainly this understanding 
of science presents important epistemological challenges, such as those 
provided not only by the distorting eff ects of scientists’ own biases, fears, 
and desires but also the needs, available funding, and other concerns found 
in any given society, as studied by Helen Longino among others.26 What is 
most important to understand in regards to my current argument, however, 
is that both among working scientists and scholars of science, science is 
conceived of as functioning through the production of testable knowledge 
claims, through a process wedded to mathematics and carried out in a social 
environment of some sort. In other words, when a modern researcher uses 
the term “science,” he or she is deploying a contextually-specifi c term with 
a host of value attributions and assumptions embedded within that term. 
It is a use that is central to a modern epistemic regime that sees proof in 
empiricist terms, which is incompatible with those regimes structured by 
discourses that view and evaluate the world following diff erent models of 
knowledge construction.
Th e connections between science and empiricism have attracted con-
siderable study, including fruitful explorations of the links between the two 
24  For a deconstruction of this valuation of physics, see Sarah Lucia HOAGLAND – Marilyn 
FRYE, “Feminist Philosophy.” In: CANFIELD, J. V. (ed.), Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge 
and Value in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge 1997, p. 209–232, 216.
25  Sergio SISMONDO discusses this point at length in Science without Myth: on Constructions, 
Reality, and Social Knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press 1996, chapters 3 
and 4.
26  Helen E. LONGINO, Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1990, especially chapters 8 through 10.
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and the relationship with not only the period commonly called the Scientifi c 
Revolution but also the Enlightenment.27 Furthermore, the way in which 
practices and thought patterns that both inform and are informed by science 
infl uence unrelated activities, from law to democracy, have been examined 
by scholars such as Alvin I. Goldman. Whether in the courtroom or in the 
voting booth decision making in the modern world is at least superfi cially 
infl uenced by concepts of proof and standards of argumentation infl uenced 
by modern science.28 However superfi cial that infl uence might be, scient-
ism – the belief that the scientifi c method is the most reliable method of 
getting at a  truth grounded in empirically-knowable reality – is a  trend 
that runs throughout modern thought,29 proving the hegemonic power of 
this epistemic regime. However, as mentioned earlier these concepts are 
part of a specifi cally modern discourse. In order to understand how far the 
viewpoints of this discourse diverge from those of the past, we should turn 
to examples that will demonstrate the confusion that results when one un-
critically applies a term such as “science” that is so deeply interwoven with 
the discursive formations that inform modernity, turning fi rst to the high 
Middle Ages.
Th at the Middle Ages in Europe were an “age of faith” was an axiom 
with a long pedigree well before Edward Gibbon made it central to his eight-
eenth-century explanation for the decline and “fall” of the Roman Empire. 
Much more recently, Edward Grant has taken the idea far more seriously 
in his consideration of how this fact infl uenced the pursuit of knowledge 
for medieval intellectuals in his study God and Reason in the Middle Ages.30 
Arguing forcefully that the Middle Ages, or at least the high and late Middle 
Ages, were as much an age of reason as of faith, Grant challenges the notion 
that the two ideas are necessarily in confl ict, and in the process outlines 
a  medieval epistemic regime (though without ever using the term) that 
functioned along thoroughly rational lines, but with far diff erent contours 
27  Ernan MCMULLIN, “Taking an Empirical Stance.” In: MONTON, B. J. (ed.), Images 
of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances. New York: Oxford University Press 2007, 
p.  167–182; Jessica RISKIN, Science in the Age of Sensibility: the Sentimental Empiricists of 
the French Enlightenment. Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press 2002, chapter 1; Th omas 
L. HANKINS, Science and the Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, 
p. 1–45.
28  GOLDMAN, chapters. 10 and 11.
29  Huston SMITH, “Scientism: Th e Bedrock of the Modern Worldview.” In: ZARANDI, M. M. 
(ed.), Science and the Myth of Progress. Bloomington: World Wisdom Inc. 2003, p. 233–248.
30  Edward GRANT, God and Reason in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2001. For what follows, see p. 148–202.
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than the modern regime with which we are most familiar. Far from a dis-
course in which empirical data gathering, modeling, and testing are seen 
as the hallmarks of rationality, this was one in which systematic logic was 
the tool for knowledge creation and it was imagined that a good researcher 
could arrive at true knowledge about the natural world through the rigorous 
employment of the logical tools developed by Aristotle in the fourth century 
BCE and expanded by Arabic-language and Latin Christian intellectuals 
thereaft er. It is true that this logical analysis of the universe was conditioned 
by common-sense observations of the world, for, as Albert the Great stated 
in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,
Everything that is accepted, which is confi rmed by a  [physical] sense is bet-
ter than that which is contradictory to sense [experience]. In conclusion, that 
which is contradictory to a sense [experience] is not to be believed.31
In other words, one should examine the phenomenological world in 
order to develop logical analyses of how that world came to be, as well as 
how change in that world occurs, and any analysis that disagrees with what 
the senses convey must be rejected.
However, in the phrase of Edward Grant this was an “empiricism 
without observation,” as it was part of the habitus for medieval natural 
philosophers that Aristotelian logic properly applied would lead to objec-
tively true knowledge about the world. Such knowledge came as the result of 
properly constructed logic problems, not through any sort of testing or even 
data gathering.32 Th is was due in large part to the place of Aristotelian logic 
in the medieval epistemic regime, as intellectuals held it to be something 
of a language of nature – and indeed the language of knowledge itself – in 
much the same way as a  modern scientist would see mathematics.33 Th is 
essay is an analysis of the way competing epistemic regimes make the use 
31  ALBERT the Great, Alberti Magni Opera omnia, Physica, pars 2. Hossfeld, P.  (ed.). 
Aschendorff : Monasterii Westfalorum 1993, p.  587. “Omnis enim acceptio, quae fi rmatur 
sensu, melior est quam illa quae sensui contradicit, et conclusio, quae sensui contradicit, est 
incredibilis.”
32  Edward GRANT, Th e Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages. Washington, 
D.C.: Th e Catholic University of America Press 2010, p. 195–225.
33  Edith Dudley SYLLA, “Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Th omas Aquinas and 
William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist.” In: MURDOCH, J. E, (ed.), Th e Cultural 
Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, 
Science, and Th eology in the Middle Ages. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 1975, p. 349–390, 
350–352.
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of value-laden terms such as science unwise and confusing rather than 
a discussion of medieval philosophy so I will pass over in silence the many 
points of disagreement that engendered heated arguments among medieval 
logicians, for those disagreements do not concern us here. Th e reason why is 
that despite such disagreements among those who shared this epistemic re-
gime, which means virtually any educated person from the high middle ages 
until the early modern period – and beyond for many scholars – scholastics 
agreed that logically-constructed arguments led to the truth when properly 
constituted. Th e reason why logic held such power in the minds of medieval 
European intellectuals was the universally-held belief that cosmological 
order was the result of divine agency, which imposed that order in accord 
with logical principles. Th erefore, divine order was infused in every part of 
the cosmos, and this order functioned and could be understood logically. In 
order to understand the place of this point in my argument, I will turn to 
the example of the rather surprising (to modern minds) role that astrology 
played in the thought of Albert the Great.
Albert was a  Swabian-born Dominican who studied at Padua before 
earning his doctorate in theology at the University of Paris some time 
around 1250. Th is educational background is signifi cant, for both of these 
schools were noted centers of Aristotelian learning in the thirteenth cen-
tury.34 Albert himself became so fascinated with Aristotelian philosophy, 
both natural and otherwise, that his fame among his contemporaries was 
largely built on his reputation as a knowledgeable commentator upon “the 
Philosopher,” as Aristotle was generally known.35 Th erefore, Albert was 
one of the acknowledged masters of Aristotelian learning in the thirteenth 
century which was signifi cant for two reasons: fi rstly, because this learning, 
or at least what medieval scholars understood this learning to be, provided 
the core of the habitus of the European intelligentsia of the period, secondly 
because the medieval epistemic regime was structured around Aristotelian 
philosophy. Within the Christianized Aristotelianism of the medieval pe-
riod, God was identifi ed as the prime mover that provided the actuating force 
34  James A. WEISHEIPL, “Th e Life and Works of St. Albert the Great.” In: WEISHEIPL, J. 
A. (ed.), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Toronto: Pontifi cal Institute of Medieval Studies 
1980, p. 13–53.
35  BONAVENTURE d’Iseo, Proohemium quarti operis of the Liber Compostellae Multorum 
Experimentorum Veritatis Fratris Bonaventura de Ysio de Ordine Fratrum Minorum. In: 
GRABMANN, M. “Der Einfl uß Alberts des Grossen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben.” In: 




for all change in the universe, and this is where astrology became important 
to the system. Although Aristotle had not evidenced any great interest in 
astrology, the doctrine of effi  cient causation he presented in his work On 
Generation and Corruption began with the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
and he emphasized that the infl uence of the sun made both the “coming to 
be” of all earthly things as well as their “passing away” possible.36
Medieval astrology was, then, built on the premise that the supralunary 
world of celestial bodies in constant motion acted as God’s intermediaries 
by infl uencing terrestrial events through the transmission of rays of light 
imparted with divine power.37 Within this model, the human body was 
presumed to be a microcosmic representation of the larger macrocosm of 
the universe. Celestial motion, combined with the qualities of individual 
celestial objects, aff ected the human body by transmitting these light rays, 
thereby infl uencing human behavior and health in ways that could be un-
derstood through the study of astrology, which imparted knowledge about 
the impact of celestial forces on terrestrial objects through an analysis of 
heavenly portents.38 According to Albert, there were “two great wisdoms,” 
and though he is never as absolutely precise in his use of terminology as 
we might wish him to be, he clearly delineates the fi rst as the fi eld of pure 
astronomy while the second is the “scientia of the judgment of the stars.”39 
While he deals with the fi rst of these “wisdoms” in a rather cursory fashion 
whenever the subject arises, astrology so fascinates him that he returns to 
the topic repeatedly throughout his career. 40 And small wonder, because 
36  John D. NORTH, “Celestial Infl uence – the Major Premiss of Astrology.” In: ZAMBELLI, 
P.  (ed.), ‘Astrologi Hallucinati’: Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time. New York: 
Walter de Gruyter 1986, p. 45–100.
37  ALBERT the Great, De caelo et mundo, Opera Omnia. Hossfeld, P.  (ed.). Aschendorff : 
Monasterii Westfalorum 1971, p. 57.
38  “Hae res omens [celestial motions] dicendae sunt in astrologia et determinandae suffi  cienter 
per principia mathematica.” Ibid., p. 185. “In astronomia enim et in scientia electionum deo 
favente loquemur adhuc de stellis et determinabimus ea quae hic relinquuntur.” Ibid., p. 154.
39  ALBERT the Great, Speculum astronomiae. In: ZAMBELLI, P.  (ed), Th e Speculum 
Astronomiae and its Enigma: Astrology, Th eology, and Science in Albertus Magnus and his 
Contemporaries. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992, p. 208: “scientia iudiciorum 
astrorum.” Th ere has been, and continues to be, much discussion about the authenticity of 
Albert’s authorship of this work, which I fi nd to be completely unfounded as I discuss in Scott 
E. HENDRIX, How Albert the Great’s Speculum astronomiae was Interpreted and Used by Four 
Centuries of Readers: A Study in Late Medieval Medicine, Astronomy and Astrology. Lewiston: 
Th e Edwin Mellen Press 2010, chapter I.
40  Any comprehensive list of Albert’s references to celestial infl uence would quickly grow 
to unmanageable proportions. For a representative view of his thoughts on the subject, see: 
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for Albert astrology is a “great wisdom” providing “a link between natural 
philosophy and metaphysics.”41 Th is is important for 
if God [...] has ordered this world [...] as to operate in created things [...] through 
stars [...] as if through instruments [...] what could be more desirable to the 
thinking man than to have a middle scientia [between natural philosophy and 
metaphysics] that may teach us how this and that change in the mundane world 
is eff ected by the changes in the heavenly bodies. 42
Th erefore, if the “thinking man” wishes to experience the creator there is no 
better way to do so than through a study of the way God works his will upon 
the earth through his celestial agents.43
Admittedly, Albert’s emphasis on astrology and celestial forces sounds 
odd to modern ears, but that is precisely because the epistemic regime within 
which he functioned was vastly diff erent than our own modernist one. 
Albert’s view of knowledge production was one in which Aristotelian logic 
held pride of place and God’s divine creation and ordering of the universe 
and all that it contains was an absolutely unquestioned part of the habitus 
of all European intellectuals. Th erefore, Albert arrived at his understand-
ing of astrology and its importance to understanding the world through his 
reading of Aristotle coupled with his study of theology and logical analyses 
of how these two fi elds of knowledge could be integrated – there was no 
empirical data gathering, modeling (mathematical or otherwise), or testing. 
Yet astrology, far from having the elements of superstition and irrationality 
that adhere to it as part of the discursive formation informing our modern 
language game, was cutting-edge natural philosophy in Albert’s day, based 
upon principles that were universally acknowledged by the intelligentsia 
ALBERT the Great, De caelo et mundo. Volume I, p. 150, 151, 153, et alia; ALBERT the Great, 
“De fato.” In: Opera Omnia. Hossfeld, P.  (ed.), Aschendorff : Monasterii Westfalorum 1975, 
p.  65–78; ALBERT the Great, “Problemata determininata.” In: Opera Omnia. Weisheipl, 
J. A. (ed.), Aschendorff : Monasterii Westfalorum 1975, p. 45–64, 48–50; ALBERT the Great, 
“Questiones.” In: Opera omnia. Froes, Albert (ed.), Aschendorff : Monasterii Westfalorum 
1993, p. 59, et aliter.
41  “Secunda magna sapientia, quae similiter astronomia dicitur, est scientia iudicorum 
astrorum, quae est ligamentum naturalis philosophiae et metaphysicae.” Ibid., p.  218–221, 
chapter. 3.
42  “Si [...] ordanavit Deus [...] mundum istum [...] velut operari in rebus creatis [...] per stellas 
[...] sicut per instrumenta [...] quid desideratius concionatori quam habere mediam scientiam, 
quae doceat nos qualiter mundanorum ad hoc et ad illud mutatio caelestium fi at corporum 
mutatione.” Ibid., p. 220, chapter 3.
43  Ibid., p. 220, chapter 3.
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of Europe. Certainly, some such as the thirteenth-century bishop of Paris 
Stephen Tempier or the fi ft eenth-century chancellor of that same univer-
sity, Jean Gerson, were suspicious of the attractiveness of astrology to their 
contemporaries but none denied its theoretical foundations.44 In fact, by the 
end of the thirteenth century it was a mainstream part of the academic cur-
riculum, with a well-developed set of theoretical justifi cations and held to be 
essential to the work of physicians as well as other learned professionals.45
Th e historical study of astrology is signifi cant in the context of my cur-
rent discussion, for many modern researchers refer to the discipline as a sci-
ence, translating the Latin scientia (certain knowledge) in this way. How-
ever, here we should avoid ahistorical applications of such a  loaded word. 
Astrology was indeed highly rational within the context of the medieval 
worldview, which is the likely reason why modern researchers infl uenced by 
the unconscious association of “logical” and “scientifi c” within the modern 
language game apply the term “science” to medieval astrology. Nevertheless, 
rather than a  science it was just what medieval intellectuals held it to be, 
a  branch of philosophia naturalis, or natural philosophy. Th e emphasis of 
all natural philosophy was indeed the natural world, a concern shared by 
the sciences, but the approach was always one of logical consideration that 
was connected to empiricism by only the loosest possible threads. Following 
Aristotle, medieval natural philosophers viewed scientia to be the grasp of 
principles that are true in and of themselves, explanatory of and prior to 
conclusions that are logical deductions drawn from those principles rather 
than the result of any sort of testing or data gathering, as exemplifi ed by 
Albert the Great’s approach to astrology.46
Perhaps just as importantly, natural philosophy was completely separate 
from mathematics, with the former dealing with material things as ap-
prehended by the senses and the latter dealing with quantitative being, and 
never, ever, with material substances.47 Sure, astrologers needed to be able 
to work out the math involved with understanding where heavenly bodies 
44  HENDRIX, chapter II.
45  Nancy SIRAISI, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1990, p. 60–68.
46  Paul T. SAGAL, “Naturalistic Epistemology and the Harakari of Philosophy.” In: SHIMONY, 
A. (ed.), Naturalistic Epistemology. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1987, p.  321–333, 
322–325.
47  William WALLACE, “Traditional Natural Philosophy.” In: SCHMITT, C. B. – SKINNER, Q. 
(eds.), Th e Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. 6th printing,. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2003, p. 201–235.
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could be found at any given time, or at least be able to understand the tables 
designed for such a purpose, but astrologers had little interest in mathemat-
ics per se and medieval mathematicians focused on their subject as a form 
of abstract knowledge utterly divorced from the phenomenological world.48
Th erefore, the medieval natural philosopher at work would most likely be 
found at his desk thinking deeply about a  topic while constructing elabo-
rately logical arguments based on a hegemonic discourse that emphasized 
Aristotle’s philosophy as the explication of God’s agency at work in the world. 
Within the medieval epistemic regime such an approach made perfect sense, 
for it was viewed as a given – in other words was part of the habitus of the 
medieval European intellectual – that knowledge of all things is to be found 
in the divine mind from eternity, therefore allowing for the uncovering of 
truth through an application of logic that brings the thinker closer to God’s 
divinity rather than mucking about in the unclean and utterly un-divine 
material world.49 Certainly a medieval scholar would consider things seen 
and observed, and Albert among others did go out of his way to gain fi rst-
hand knowledge of aspects of the phenomenological world ranging from 
meteorites to crystals, but such observations were tangential to the logical 
formulations that comprised the medieval construction of knowledge.
Modern researchers who have not taken these contextual considera-
tions into account have repeatedly been led to ahistorical conclusions about 
what historical actors were thinking and doing. Moving away for a moment 
from medieval astrology, the best example of the cloudy vision of the past 
that has resulted from an approach that does not include the techniques of 
historical epistemology is to be found in Alistair Crombie’s extravagantly 
positive analysis of the work of the thirteenth-century bishop of Lincoln, 
Robert Grosseteste. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 
Grosseteste stated that scientia is 
the comprehension of the truth of those things which always behave in a given 
manner, and in mathematics both the premises and conclusions are known in 
this way [...] Th erefore, to know simply and most appropriately is to understand 
the unchanging cause of a  thing in itself, [...] and this knowledge is the most 
48  Jan SALAMUCHA, Knowledge and Faith. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993, p. 75–81.




special goal of this [metaphysics] and is acquired by demonstration most prop-
erly called.50
For Crombie this passage is proof that Grosseteste applied mathematical 
modeling to experimental procedures to arrive at certain demonstrations, 
but this interpretation is indicative of Crombie’s training as a  modern 
scientist who acquired the habitus of a modern epistemic regime. Eileen F. 
Serene has studied Grosseteste’s writings with greater sensitivity to histori-
cal context than that exercised by Crombie, and she has concluded that what 
this passage and others point to is an emphasis on logical verifi cation of 
natural phenomena rather than empirical testing.51 Granted, Grosseteste felt 
that sense experience could inspire the higher human powers and he had an 
appreciation of mathematics’ power to reveal natural truths that was well 
ahead of his time,52 but in his approach examination of the natural world, 
the revelation of truth, and mathematics were not mutually reinforcing ap-
proaches, and nowhere in his method is there any form of testing aside from 
logical analysis.
Th e key point is that “science,” as we understand that term today, is 
a methodology or set of methodologies that did not develop until the seven-
teenth century. Th e curious blending of experimental testing, mathematical 
modeling, and general theory formation came about through a series of social 
and historical processes that generate heated debates among scholars over 
their nature, the order in which they occurred, whether or not the process or 
end result was revolutionary, and a dozen other areas of contention unlikely 
to be settled any time soon.53 But as with the debates of medieval scholars 
over the role and function of logic, it is unnecessary for us to consider these 
debates in detail, though we should briefl y consider what it is about these 
developments that make for something so diff erent in conception and ex-
ecution that we may properly understand that a new epistemic regime came 
into being in this period. In other words, the proper processes of knowledge 
production, and even what “knowledge” is, were reinvented during this 
period beginning with the study of the natural world before spreading to 
50  Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, quoted in A. C. CROMBIE, Robert Grosseteste and 
the Origins of Experimental Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1953, p. 58–59.
51  Eileen F. SERENE, “Robert Grosseteste on Induction and Demonstrative Science,” Synthese, 
vol. 40 1979, no. 1, p. 97–115.
52  James MCEVOY, Th e Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982, 
p. 167–170.
53  For the best recent treatment of these debates, see H. F. COHEN, Th e Scientifi c Revolution: 
A Historiographical Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.
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the epistemological systems of every branch of human knowledge. But even 
during this period commonly known as the Scientifi c Revolution, using the 
term science without proper regard for attendant discursive formations can 
act to cloud our understanding. In order to illustrate my point, I will focus 
on Galileo Galilei (d. 1642) both for the familiarity that readers will have 
with him as well as for the misunderstandings that have arisen about him 
due precisely to the work he did that has long since established him as an 
iconic fi gure in the development of science.
Th ere is no doubt that Galileo will continue to be an important fi gure 
in the history of science, though his singular role in the development of the 
scientifi c method has been made far more complex by recent scholarship. 
While Alexandre Koyré was perhaps overly hasty in his emphasis on Pla-
tonism and metaphysics in Galileo’s thought, not to mention his attempts 
to overturn the notion that experimental procedures played an important 
role in the Pisan mathematician’s work, his attack on what has been called 
the “Galileo legend” bore fruit by leading others to examine more closely 
what it was that Galileo actually accomplished.54 Far from decisively break-
ing with the approach of his predecessors and contemporaries, it seems that 
Galileo was altogether more willing to learn from developments occurring 
around him than has been imagined in the past, and clearly his reputation 
owes much to developments actually introduced by his followers.55 However, 
thanks to more careful reading of Galileo’s voluminous writings as well as 
modern reconstructions of experiments such as that of the inclined plane, it 
can no longer be imagined as Koyré once did that Galileo conducted experi-
ments only in his head.56 All of this is well and good, and certainly more in 
keeping with an approach that is respectful of the changing of epistemic 
regimes over time, but what was it that Galileo actually did?
As Winfred Lovell Wisan has remarked, developing an answer to the 
above question is not easy, because Galileo failed “to provide a systematic 
account of his views,” instead leaving “brief comments on philosophy and 
54  Alexandre KOYRE, Metaphysics and Measurement. R. E. W. Maddison (trans.). London: 
Chapman and Hall 1968.
55  See the essays in Jürgen RENN’s Galileo in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2001.
56  Stillman DRAKE, Galileo at Work: His Scientifi c Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1978; Th omas B. SETTLE, “An Experiment in the History of Science.” Science, vol. 133, 
1961, no. 3445, p. 19–23.
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method [...] scattered throughout his writings.”57 However, it is clear that the 
interest in mathematics, which he once called “the language of nature,” that 
he shared with many of his contemporaries led him to seek to establish his 
work on the lines of “certain” demonstrations. Very oft en he felt that this was 
an impossible task, but in the attempt he did establish methods for show-
ing that his ideas about motion (among other things) could be supported by 
applied demonstrations – or what we would now call experiments. Galileo 
himself viewed his mathematical propositions dealing with motion and the 
techniques applied to derive them as his most important contributions due 
to their capacity for “demonstrative discovery” of new propositions, as he 
termed it. For Galileo, one interested in uncovering the truth must begin 
with “evident principles,” and thus the demonstrative experiments he de-
veloped were never intended to uncover the root causes of things, but in his 
quest for ever-more-sophisticated demonstrations he was constantly push-
ing into the realm of increasingly remote causes of things, leading to the 
uncovering of principles that were anything but evident. Th e result was that 
while he lacked any philosophical model of inductive knowledge formation 
based on hypothesis and experiment such as that which supposedly drives 
modern scientists, his work nevertheless followed a process of mathemati-
cal modeling, demonstrative experiment, and analysis that one would be at 
a loss not to call scientifi c.
However, Galileo also provides an excellent example of the dangers of 
assuming that the early modern epistemic regime within which he worked 
closely maps that of a modern one. Th is problem has arisen, in part, precisely 
because of the previously-mentioned “Galileo legend,” which acts as a  fi l-
tering prism through which modern people – especially modern scientists 
– view the work and ideas not just of Galileo himself, but oft en of any fi gure 
that has come to be associated with the Scientifi c Revolution.58 No better 
example can be found than in the view that modern intellectuals have of 
Galileo’s relationship to astrology. It has long been an article of faith among 
scholars that Galileo was a “constant adversary of divinatory astrology,” to 
quote the historian Eugenio Garin.59 Th is attitude toward Galileo has also 
57  Winifred Lovell WISAN, “Galileo’s Scientifi c Method: A Reexamination.” In: BUTTS, R. 
E. – PITTS, J. C. (eds.) New Perspectives on Galileo. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1978, 
p. 1–58, 1. Th e rest of this paragraph comes from this source.
58  Th omas M. LESSL, “Th e Galileo Legend as Scientifi c Folklore,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
vol. 85, 1999, no. 2, p. 146–168.
59  Eugenio GARIN, Astrology in the Renaissance: Th e Zodiac of Life ‎. Jackson, Carolyn – Allen, 
June (trans.). New York: Routledge 1983, p. 10.
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been common among both philosophers of science such as Karl Popper as 
well as scientists such as Carl Sagan.60 Unfortunately, evidence is not on the 
side of this position. As long ago as 1881 the editor of Galileo’s collected 
works, Antonio Favaro, published an article entitled “Galileo Astrologo,” 
which has recently been translated and included in a  special volume on 
Galileo’s Astrology released by Culture and Cosmos in 2003.61 Although 
Favaro’s conclusions were tentative and he suggested that perhaps Galileo 
had lost interest in astrology as he aged, the evidence presented leaves the 
reader with no doubt that Galileo frequently cast horoscopes. Th is evidence 
ranges from the natal chart (a horoscope predicting an individual’s future 
based on his or her time of birth or conception) Galileo cast for the Grand 
Duke Cosimo II of Florence to epistolary discussions of horoscopes in which 
Galileo engaged with important but distant fi gures such as the Cardinal 
Allesandro d’Este as well close friends such as Giovanfrancesco Sagredo.62 
Yet even today historians attempt to explain away Galileo’s astrological 
pursuits as an activity intended to garner patronage from powerful people 
such as the Dukes of Florence,63 quickly pass over it as an activity in which 
he “dabbled,” 64 or ignore it altogether.65
However, if we take the time to examine the horoscopes that Galileo 
cast there can be no doubt that he was completely earnest in his belief in 
the importance of the discipline. Turning to such evidence in MS. Gal. 81 
we fi nd not only horoscopes that could have been intended to garner the 
support of a patron – such as the aforementioned one for Cosimo II – but 
also those that Galileo did for himself, his daughters, and twenty as yet to 
be identifi ed people.66 Darrell Rutkin has devoted some time to analyzing 
the natal charts for Galileo’s daughters as well as those cast for his friend 
Giovanni Francesco Sagredo, noting the care with which these charts are 
60  Karl POPPER, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1975, p. 176; “Th e Harmony of the Worlds.” Cosmos, Carl Sagan, PBS 1980.
61  Antonio FAVARO, “Galileo Astrologo.” Evans, Julianne (trans.), Culture and Cosmos, vol. 
7, 2003, no. 1, p. 9–19.
62  Ibid., p. 11–13.
63  Richard TARNASS, Th e Passion of the Western Mind. New York, Random House 1993, 
p. 295.
64  Wade ROWLAND, Galileo’s Mistake: A New Look at the Epic Confrontation Between Galileo 
and the Church. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003, p. 295.
65  Peter K. MACHAMER, Th e Cambridge Companion to Galileo. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1995, passim.
66  H. Darrel RUTKIN, “Galileo Astrologer: Astrology and Mathematical Practice in the Late 
Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries.” Galilaena, vol. 2, 2005, p. 107–143.
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constructed. Th e purpose of such charts could not possibly have been to earn 
a fee or garner patronage, leaving us to see the care with which Galileo ap-
proached his work as an indication of the respect for the discipline in which 
he was engaged.
Clearly, the existence of this sizeable number of carefully-constructed 
horoscopes in Galileo’s own hand demonstrates not only that the Italian sci-
entist was quite familiar with the workings of predictive astrology, but also 
that when he did construct a chart he demonstrated both a great deal of care 
as well as ability. It is true that these horoscopes all seem to date to the late 
1580s and 1590s while he was a professor of mathematics at Padua, but there 
is nothing to suggest that he changed his mind about the discipline aft er his 
appointment to the position of “Chief Mathematician of the University of 
Pisa and Philosopher and Mathematician to the Grand Duke” of Tuscany in 
1610. Instead, it is just as likely that other concerns simply kept him too busy 
for such pursuits, especially since he became increasingly anxious to solidify 
his status as a philosopher rather than simply a professor of mathematics.67 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary we must assume that Galileo 
maintained his early interest in astrology throughout his life.
Th is point is not merely one of antiquarianism. Th e epistemic regime 
within which astrology was a rational part of the intellectual view of the world 
was one in which knowledge construction was based on working within 
a  system built by foundational thinkers who saw the cosmos as an inter-
linked whole, as distant celestial bodies interacted with one another and the 
earth in entirely consistent and mathematically describable ways. Christian 
thinkers inherited the outlines of this system from Antiquity, building upon 
this foundation the version we encountered above by placing the beginning 
of the system of infl uences with God. However, Western theologians agreed 
that he did not ordinarily intervene in his creation thereaft er. Th erefore, the 
cosmos functioned with mechanical precision, as if it were clockwork in the 
phrase of the fourteenth-century intellectual Nicole Oresme.68 Th is is the 
astrological system that Galileo inherited, and it is interesting to speculate 
upon the infl uence of the mechanical aspects of this model upon Galileo’s 
own system of thought. If nothing else, interest in astrology and the desire 
to produce accurate horoscopes would have provided a strong incentive for 
67  Mario BIAGOLI, Galileo, Courtier: Th e Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994, chapter 1.
68  John NORTH, Th e Norton History of Astronomy and Cosmology. New York: W. W. Norton 
1995, p. 265.
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Galileo to think deeply about the motions of the heavens. Regardless of the 
positive infl uences that his role as an astrologer may or may not have had, 
though, one thing is certain: Whether astrological theory provided an impe-
tus for Galileo’s burgeoning mechanical philosophy or not, there can be no 
doubt that it is anachronistic to look for a rejection of astrology during this 
period as a sign of scientifi c rationalism.
By this point it should be clear that the application of the word “sci-
ence” to the premodern world should be done only aft er the most careful 
consideration of not only what the researcher is analyzing, but also the place 
that this term holds within our modern epistemic regime in which “science” 
is part of a larger discursive formation. Th is formation is one that brings the 
concepts not only of “rational” and “scientifi c” together, but also “modern,” 
“mathematical,” and “empirically tested.” Given the place of science in the 
modern world and the social capital it commands within the Western habi-
tus, researchers should invoke the term to describe knowledge constructs 
prior to the seventeenth century only with the greatest care and hesitancy. 
Th is point has not gone wholly unacknowledged, as Alistair Crombie im-
plied something quite similar when he argued that we must be “concerned 
above all with people and their vision,” and acknowledged that words can 
have highly divergent meanings when employed within diff ering historical 
contexts, saying “experiment itself may have diff erent meanings and inten-
tions in diff ering contexts. We must approach our subject with an explicit 
cultural relativism.”69 A  step in the right direction, surely, but Crombie 
would have done better to urge his readers to stick to the use of terms that 
do not do violence to the history he was trying to understand. Ultimately, 
what is at stake is not only the risk of imprecision, but a sort of modernist 
chauvinism that threatens to undermine any attempt to understand the past. 
Th is seems like too steep a price to pay for careless use of language.
69  A. C. CROMBIE, Styles of Scientifi c Th inking in the European Tradition. Volume I. London: 
Th e Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 1994, p. 5.
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